Ukraine: predictions

The BBC, which is doing impressive coverage of the fighting, has this piece setting out 5 possible scenarios for the war in Ukraine. They are:

(1) Short war ("Kyiv falls within days ... Ukraine joins Belarus as a client state");

(2) Long war ("... perhaps after many years, with maybe new leadership in Moscow, Russian forces eventually leave Ukraine, bowed and bloodied, just as their predecessors left Afghanistan in 1989 ...");

(3) European war ("Might it be possible this war could spill outside Ukraine's borders?");

(4) Diplomatic solution (the BBC's suggestion seems rather optimistic for Ukraine "Ukraine, say, accepts Russian sovereignty over Crimea and parts of the Donbas. In turn, Putin accepts Ukrainian independence and its right to deepen ties with Europe"); and

(5) Putin ousted (self-explanatory).

The BBC seems to regard the "long war" as the single most likely: it describes it as "Perhaps more likely" than the short war, and the remaining options are introduced with questions. This, I think, reflects the conventional wisdom as at the time of writing, which is what we should hope for from the BBC: it is a mainstream reporter of the news, not an opinionated columnist out to shock with contrarian views.

But I disagree: I think this will be a "short war". Russia seems to have faced stiffer resistance than it was expecting (the paratrooper attack on Hostomel Airport is a good example of this), and perhaps it has worse logistics than one would have expected, but it's only been a week and Russia is well on its way to taking control of the Black Sea coast and major cities are starting to fall. It has lost the propaganda war, but by the standard of short wars (the invasion of Iraq, the fall of France in WWII), this looks to me like a short war in military terms.

What about ongoing resistance/guerilla warfare/insurgency, perhaps fuelled by the West? I put the chances of this at comfortably below 50%, and I'll explain why. I have 4 reasons.

(1) Ukraine is a developed country. Not terribly rich or successful, but one with developed infrastructure, cities and all the rest of it. That means that the standard of life that is achievable by cooperating with the powers that be is very much higher than that achievable by living in the woods and attempting sabotage missions. Asymmetric warfare surely requires asymmetric living conditions: it's a first world vs third world, tribespeople vs regular infantry kind of thing. But Ukraine and Russia have symmetric living conditions. 

(2) Following on from (1), Ukraine has a very low birthrate. It is not a country which can afford the kind of high loss, "you have to be lucky every time" approach demanded by asymmetric warfare. Suicide missions, for example, are simply not going to happen.

(3) There's no chance of winning. There may well be some amazingly brave acts of resistance that will take place even after the government in Kyiv has thrown in the towel. There were heroic deeds done by the French Resistance, after all, despite the symmetric living conditions of the French and the Germans. (But note that the French Resistance, for all its valour, did not render the Battle of France a long war.) But it was plausible at all times, and likely from at least 1943, that France would one day be liberated by the Allies. Is there any prospect of Ukraine being liberated by force? Does Ukraine have any allies? No and no. Ukraine has well-wishers galore, but no country is sworn to protect it and there will be no NATO tanks crossing into Ukraine to push the Russians back. Resistance, as the Borg say, is futile. What would resistance be for? 

(4) Finally, and here I think I add something to the debate, consider for a moment who would do the fighting - and where they are likely to be. If there is one thing that unites the people of Europe and their various political leaders, it is a willingness to welcome Ukrainian refugees. The EU expects 4 million refugees (10% of the population), which it will welcome with open arms, and I suspect that is merely the latest underestimate of how willing East Europeans are to move westward. In the UK, the leaders of the devolved assemblies, keen to show that they are doing something, will try to attract as many refugees as possible, and the government in Westminster will only try to appear more welcoming. The well-intentioned peoples of the wider West, especially in North America, will encourage Ukrainians too, and anywhere that already has a Ukrainian community can expect to see many new arrivals. 

This is all well and good, of course, and we should certainly help refugees as much as we can. But it does mean that Ukraine will be rapidly denuded of a large chunk of its working-age (i.e., fighting-age) population. Women and children are leaving now, in their thousands and their husbands and fathers will want to follow. From the point of view of Ukrainians offered the choice between a warm welcome on generous terms in a rich country in the West - all the benefits of EU membership handed to them as an unexpected gift - or staying to fight a hopeless campaign of sabotage against an enemy renowned for ruthlessness ... well, let's just say that discretion - and the chance to earn big money - will be the better part of valour for most. I would not be at all surprised if, in years to come, we hear many Ukrainians tell us, after a few drinks, that they would have stayed to fight - in fact they did fight, quite a bit as it happens - but then their wife/girlfriend/mother told them to make a new life in the West, keep Ukrainian culture alive in exile, wait for things to improve etc etc. We should humour them; we wouldn't want to be in their position.

Won't the authorities want to keep people from leaving? I don't think so. Why would they? Once the official war is over and a new government installed in Kyiv, is there any reason that it - or its Russian controllers - will want to keep restive and resistant men of fighting age within its borders? On the contrary, not long ago, we saw migrants weaponised by Belarus: why not expect more of the same from a Russian-controlled Ukraine - thousands of migrants released to place burdens on Europe? After a while, of course, Ukraine will not want to be completely depopulated, and border controls will be reinstated, but, in the short term, getting rid of the rowdier and more patriotic elements, those men who are wholly opposed to becoming part of a greater Russia and who already have guns in their hands, will be a net positive for the new regime, and there are bound to be plenty of people content enough to live under it to make it work, just about. We should recall that Ukraine is valued for its geographical position and its raw materials, not its workforce. (There is also an historical precedent. When the USSR invaded Finland, apparently, "The people in occupied areas were given a choice to stay if they wanted. Something like a dozen stayed, about 420 000 chose to become refugees instead.") 

Won't the authorities be scared of exiles organising themselves for a counter-attack? I think not. If there is one thing that NATO doesn't want, it is to give Russia a casus belli, and arming bands of Ukrainians to launch Bay of Pigs-style attacks on Ukraine from Poland or Hungary looks very much like a casus belli. Much better - much safer for all concerned - if displaced Ukrainians are dispersed across Europe and beyond.

All of which leads me to conclude that this is going to be a horrible, short war. Moreover, it's depressing to say it, but starting from where we are, that might be for the best.