1. Bruno Maçães says that "With this deal the UK gets to have its cake and eat it too, just what everyone said was impossible", and links to this piece by Wolfgang Münchau in the FT. Maçães also pointed me to this, again in the FT but this time by Gideon Rachman. The FT is an organ of Remainer-dom, but these pieces struck me as well-balanced. They are generally pro-the agreement.
2. On the other hand, the exemplar of sane but very keen pro-Leave thought is Daniel Hannan. Here he makes this point "when the clever and amiable David Lidington urges us to back the withdrawal deal on grounds that “the 52 per cent get control of laws, money, borders + out of CFP; the 48 per cent get closer trade partnership with EU than Canada or any advanced economy + cooperation on police & security,” I really want to agree. // Liders, after all, is more or less taking the line I have been taking over the past two years. A 52-48 vote, as I kept telling anyone who’d listen, was not a mandate for a radical break, but for a phased and partial recovery of powers. When critics complained that we’d be left “half in, half out”, I’d retort that that was pretty much the way the nation had voted, and that there was no dishonour looking for a middle way." This is indeed what Hannan has been saying right from the moment the result came out, and it broadly similar to the view Rachman and Lidington take of the matter. But Hannan comes out against the deal, and he talks more directly to the details of the agreement than Rachman or Münchau. I think it is fair to say that it is the kind of agreement that a Remainer who thought immigration was a big issue in the referendum would reach, rather than the kind of agreement that Hannan and the best kinds of Leaver would reach. On the other hand, I'm sure that if Cameron had achieved what this deal is accused of being, i.e. Remain but with no freedom of movement, he would still be the Prime Minister. Take that as praise or criticism as you think fit.
3. On another note entirely, here is an article in the Irish Times explaining how a no-deal Brexit with WTO rules could work out very nicely for British-Irish border cooperation.
4. Not a short link, but the Government's assessment of the economic impact of Brexit is here. The only point I want to make is that it does not say that Brexit, no matter how hard or no-dealish, will make Britain or British people worse off. This is made clear right at the outset, on page 9: "It is expected that in all scenarios considered in this publication, the economy will continue to grow in the long run. The estimates show the relative impacts of different trading arrangements." The figures that are given in the report are the modelled differences between how much richer we will be in 2035-2036 depending on different assumptions as to trade and migration patterns. This is not a big distinction to homo economicus, who considers losses and foregone gains equably, but it matters to real people. Imagine saying "not working on Saturdays could make you X% poorer!" when you really just meant that someone could be X% richer if they worked on Saturdays. Or think of it more like this: how much money do I have to offer you, to be paid in 2036, to accept a political structure that you either do or do not want now? If you want the structure then I don't need to offer you anything. If you don't want it - if you regard it as akin to a servitude that condemns your grandchildren to the prospect of being conscripted to fight Russia in a war that does not concern you - it's going to take a bit more than a small percentage pay rise in 2036. And bear in mind that I am not promising you that money in 2036, I'm just telling you that it might happen if my assumptions are correct - and, by the way, you know that I favour the outcome I am trying to persuade you to accept. It would be very disappointing if this kind of analysis changes anyone's mind about Brexit.
4. Not a short link, but the Government's assessment of the economic impact of Brexit is here. The only point I want to make is that it does not say that Brexit, no matter how hard or no-dealish, will make Britain or British people worse off. This is made clear right at the outset, on page 9: "It is expected that in all scenarios considered in this publication, the economy will continue to grow in the long run. The estimates show the relative impacts of different trading arrangements." The figures that are given in the report are the modelled differences between how much richer we will be in 2035-2036 depending on different assumptions as to trade and migration patterns. This is not a big distinction to homo economicus, who considers losses and foregone gains equably, but it matters to real people. Imagine saying "not working on Saturdays could make you X% poorer!" when you really just meant that someone could be X% richer if they worked on Saturdays. Or think of it more like this: how much money do I have to offer you, to be paid in 2036, to accept a political structure that you either do or do not want now? If you want the structure then I don't need to offer you anything. If you don't want it - if you regard it as akin to a servitude that condemns your grandchildren to the prospect of being conscripted to fight Russia in a war that does not concern you - it's going to take a bit more than a small percentage pay rise in 2036. And bear in mind that I am not promising you that money in 2036, I'm just telling you that it might happen if my assumptions are correct - and, by the way, you know that I favour the outcome I am trying to persuade you to accept. It would be very disappointing if this kind of analysis changes anyone's mind about Brexit.
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