Last year, the High Court decided a case called "Mazur" (the full reference is available lower down this post, if you're interested). The appeal from the decision was recently heard over three days in the Court of Appeal. I've asked some AIs to predict the outcome.
It seemed to me that this case is a good test for a couple of reasons. The first instance decision attracted a lot of attention in the legal professions because it concerned the question of whether certain legal tasks have to be carried out by fully-qualified solicitors and the extent to which other professionals, with other (or no) qualifications, can assist. So it's a decision that potentially has a big impact on the business of law firms and has therefore attracted a lot of informed comment for the AIs to consider. On the other hand, the case is of much less interest to the general public, so there is little by way of general media comment. All of which made me think that an AI that 'reads' the public information on the case will get a fairly good steer on what it is all about.
The test I gave the AIs was not to replicate what a lawyer would do when giving advice to their own client. Instead, I was asking them to do something akin to what a law firm does when it publishes a note on a case of wider significance in which it is not itself involved: the kind of thing intended to keep clients updated and show that the law firm is a 'thought leader'.
I've cut and pasted the AIs' predictions below, in advance of the judgment, so that we can all look back after the event and judge them more fully. The headlines are as follows:
- Claude/Sonnet was reluctant to answer the question, saying that the appeal fell after its cut-off date, and I was disinclined to spend any time bringing it up to speed. I have not quoted it below.
- LeChat/Mistral made some howlers that discredited it in my eyes.
- Grok was perhaps most helpful. It immediately gave a convincing answer.
- ChatGPT took some prodding to produce a full answer, but gave a decent one in the end.
But even in advance of seeing if they are right, we can ask how they did on the test I gave them. How does their work product compare to asking a junior lawyer to write a report of this kind?
On balance, as at the time of writing (and I know things change quickly), I'd still rather have the lawyer for this job. But a lawyer at £X per hour working for a few hours, or a few seconds on Grok? That's much closer. One lawyer checking for howlers plus a decent AI doing the legwork would be far more efficient. As one on-line commentator said, AIs are very good at curing 'blank page' panic.
Full details below the break.
Grok
Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025]
EWHC 2341 (KB)
The case of Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP
[2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) centers on a dispute over unpaid legal fees, where
Charles Russell Speechlys LLP (CRS) instructed another firm, Goldsmith Bowers
Solicitors (GBS), to pursue recovery from Julia Mazur and Jerome Stuart.
The core issue arose because an unauthorised paralegal at
GBS (Mr Middleton) signed and issued key litigation documents under the
supervision of a qualified solicitor (Mr Ashall), leading to a county court
stay on the proceedings and a subsequent costs order against Mazur and Stuart
of £10,653.
On appeal to the High Court, Mr Justice Sheldon ruled in
their favor, quashing the costs order and holding that "conduct of
litigation" is a reserved legal activity under the Legal Services Act 2007
(LSA 2007). Only authorised persons (e.g., solicitors with practising
certificates or certain exempt professionals like CILEX Fellows with litigation
rights) may perform it—even within a regulated firm and under supervision.
Unauthorised individuals may assist but cannot take formal
steps or exercise control. This interpretation rejected earlier SRA guidance to
GBS that supervision sufficed, deeming it "clearly wrong."
The ruling caused widespread disruption in the legal sector,
as many firms rely on paralegals, trainees, and non-solicitors for litigation
tasks, prompting temporary halts in practices and concerns over past cases'
validity.
blackstonechambers.com +24
The Appeal
The appeal, led by the Chartered Institute of Legal
Executives (CILEX) as an interested party/appellant (with Mazur and Stuart as
respondents appearing as litigants in person), was heard over three-and-a-half
days from 23-26 February 2026 in the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) before a
high-powered panel: Master of the Rolls Sir Geoffrey Vos, Lord Justice Birss
(Chancellor of the High Court), and Lady Justice Andrews.
Permission to appeal was granted in December 2025, with the
hearing expedited due to the case's sector-wide impact.
Multiple interveners participated: the Association of
Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL), Law Centres Network, Law Society, Solicitors
Regulation Authority (SRA), and Legal Services Board (LSB).
CILEX was represented pro bono by Nicholas Bacon KC and
Helen Evans KC of 4 New Square (instructed by Iain Miller of Kingsley Napley).
The hearing was not publicly livestreamed due to the
presence of unrepresented parties but was accessible remotely via a
court-provided link to around 400 observers.
Judgment was reserved, with no fixed delivery date, though
sources express hope for a swift resolution given the urgency.
judiciary.uk +28
Summary of Key Arguments in the Appeal Hearing
The appeal focused on three main grounds:
- whether
unauthorised persons can "conduct litigation" under supervision;
- the
proper interpretation of "conduct of litigation" under the LSA
2007; and
- whether
past proceedings affected by unauthorised conduct can be retrospectively
validated.
Arguments drew on statutory interpretation, parliamentary
intent, pre-LSA case law (e.g., Agassi v Robinson [2005] EWCA Civ 1507, Doe d
Bennett v Hale (1850), and R (AUH) v Westminster Magistrates' Court [2023] EWHC
562), and practical impacts.
Here's a breakdown by party/intervener, based on detailed
hearing reports:
• CILEX (Appellant, led by Nicholas Bacon KC and Helen
Evans KC):
Argued the LSA 2007 did not intend to change the pre-2007
"settled position" allowing delegation to supervised unauthorised
staff (e.g., paralegals or managing clerks), as evidenced by House of Lords
precedents and exemptions in Schedule 3.
"Conduct of litigation" should be limited to
"formal steps" in proceedings (e.g., issuing claims, not mechanical
tasks like filing).
Criticised the High Court's binary approach as overly
narrow, running contrary to LSA objectives like access to justice and
competition.
Highlighted "shockwaves" in the profession,
including risks to diversity (CILEX members are disproportionately from
underrepresented groups) and firm models.
Sought costs immunity for members acting in good faith on
prior guidance.
cilex.org.uk +7
• APIL (Intervener, led by Ben Williams KC):
Supported the appeal, arguing no parliamentary intent to
alter pre-LSA delegation practices.
Challenged the related Baxter v Doble [2023] EWHC 486 (KB)
ruling as wrongly expanding "conduct of litigation," creating a
"perfect storm" with Mazur.
If upheld, sought retrospective validation of affected cases
to avoid invalidating "an entire generation" of proceedings.
• Law Centres Network (Intervener, led by PJ Kirby KC):
Backed the appeal to preserve access to justice for
vulnerable clients (e.g., in housing/welfare cases).
Post-Mazur, centres have reduced services, lost staff, and
faced budget strains from needing more solicitors for supervision.
Argued delegation is essential for their model (e.g., one
solicitor overseeing five caseworkers), aligning with LSA goals like public
interest and affordability.
newlawjournal.co.uk +3
• Law Society (Intervener, led by Richard Coleman KC):
Opposed the appeal, urging upholding Mazur.
Rights to conduct reserved activities are personal and
non-delegable; unauthorised staff can assist (e.g., research, draft) but
authorised persons must retain control and responsibility.
No pre-LSA allowance for wholesale delegation;
"carrying on" an activity requires direct involvement.
Warned of public harm (e.g., lost liberty/funds) if relaxed,
rejecting claims of sector "disarray" as overstated.
Neutral on Baxter.
lawsociety.org.uk +5
• SRA (Intervener, led by Mark Lowenthal):
Supported upholding Mazur, aligning with the Law Society.
Unauthorised staff can assist extensively but cannot
direct/control cases or take formal steps without authorised oversight.
Rejected "floodgates" fears of challenges to past
cases, as courts can dismiss unmerited ones.
Emphasised public protection from incompetence; no blanket
prohibition but rigorous supervision required.
Noted good-faith defences possible but risky.
sra.org.uk +4
• LSB (Intervener, led by James Sandbach):
Neutral but leaned toward upholding, arguing unauthorised
persons can assist but not supervise/control.
Noted LSA imperfections but parliamentary intent for
barriers against unauthorised practice.
lawsociety.org.uk +2
• Julia Mazur and Jerome Stuart (Respondents, litigants
in person):
Supported upholding Mazur.
Argued "conduct of litigation" is straightforward
and reserved to authorised persons for fairness and public protection.
Criticised regulators' failures (e.g., SRA's initial wrong
advice, CILEX's shifting guidance) and loss of focus on consumer interests.
Sought costs from CILEX, noting their unwilling involvement.
lawgazette.co.uk +2
Judicial Indications from the Hearing
The panel engaged actively, probing practicalities without
tipping their hand decisively:
• Sir Geoffrey Vos:
Expressed frustration with "needle-point" debates
on fine distinctions (e.g., assisting vs. conducting), calling some conclusions
"jolly binary."
Questioned risks of criminal offences for routine delegation
(e.g., solicitors on holiday allowing clerks to issue claims) and impacts on
small firms.
Liked analogies like "Postman Pat" for mechanical
tasks but sought clarity on lines between allowed/disallowed acts.
Commended Mazur and Stuart's submissions as among the week's
best.
Noted the case was "very interesting" upon
reserving judgment.
• Lord Justice Birss:
Viewed "carrying on" as a factual question of
substantive performance and responsibility; suggested unauthorised can handle
tasks if authorised retains accountability.
• Lady Justice Andrews:
Emphasised personal responsibility in management; periodic
checks suffice in most cases, but not wholesale delegation.
No overt lean was reported, but the judges' focus on
real-world scenarios (e.g., holidays, high-volume claims) and irritation with
extremes suggest a desire for pragmatic guidance beyond Sheldon's strict
ruling.
lawgazette.co.uk +2
My Opinion on the Likely Outcome
In my view, the appeal is likely to succeed in part, with
the Court of Appeal upholding the core principle from Mazur that "conduct
of litigation" is reserved to authorised persons but providing detailed
guidance to clarify that supervised delegation of certain tasks (e.g.,
administrative or mechanical steps like filing documents, research, or drafting
under direct approval) is permissible, so long as the authorised person retains
ultimate control, responsibility, and decision-making authority. This would restore
a version of the pre-Mazur status quo without fully overturning the High
Court's statutory interpretation.
Full Reasons for This Prediction
1. Statutory Interpretation and Precedent
The LSA 2007's text (sections 12-14, 18, 21; Schedule 2-3)
clearly reserves litigation conduct to authorised/exempt persons, supporting
Sheldon's view that supervision alone doesn't confer entitlement.
Pre-LSA cases (e.g., Doe d Bennett) allowed delegation, but
the Act's purpose was to tighten regulation for consumer protection, as argued
by the Law Society/SRA.
However, exemptions (e.g., for employees in
probate/conveyancing) and parliamentary debates suggest no intent for wholesale
disruption of common practices.
The court may distinguish Mazur from Baxter and Agassi,
narrowing "conduct" to key formal/judgmental steps (e.g., deciding to
issue proceedings) while allowing assistance on others.
39essex.com +7
2. Practical and Sector Impacts
The hearing highlighted Mazur's "shockwaves,"
including reduced access to justice (e.g., law centres cutting services),
threats to diversity/competition, and firm viability (e.g., high-volume PI
practices or small solicitors unable to delegate during absences).
Interveners like APIL and Law Centres provided compelling
evidence of real harm, aligning with LSA objectives (s.1: access to justice,
public interest).
A full uphold would risk chaos, including
"floodgates" of challenges to past cases—though the SRA downplayed
this, judges probed it.
Retrospective validation (ground 3) may be granted for
good-faith actions to avoid nullifying proceedings.
lawsociety.org.uk +16
3. Judicial Engagement and Panel Composition
Vos's questions on everyday scenarios (e.g., holidays,
sampling files) indicate concern over an overly rigid rule creating
"criminal offences" for standard practices.
Birss and Andrews focused on "fact and degree"
tests for responsibility, suggesting a nuanced outcome.
This panel is reform-minded (Vos on legal tech/access; Birss
on IP/practicality), unlikely to endorse full disruption without safeguards.
Their "very interesting" comment implies
appreciation for the complexity.
lawgazette.co.uk +4
4. Regulatory and Public Interest Balance
Regulators (SRA/LSB) and the Law Society prioritised
protection, but interveners showed harms outweigh benefits.
The LSB's planned post-hearing review suggests openness to
change.
Mazur/Stuart's consumer-focused arguments resonated, but the
court may balance this with sector needs.
A partial win avoids "existential crisis" while
upholding LSA principles.
sra.org.uk +4
5. Comparative Precedents and Broader Context
Similar disruptions (e.g., Denton on relief from sanctions)
led to clarifying guidance.
Sources describe this as a "World Cup final" for
the profession, with expectations of far-reaching implications like those in
Mitchell v News Group Newspapers [2013].
A full overturn is unlikely (as it would undermine the LSA),
but clarification aligns with calls for "certainty and clarity."
newlawjournal.co.uk +5
If the appeal fully fails, expect immediate LSB/SRA guidance
and potential legislative reform.
If it succeeds outright, pre-Mazur practices resume, with
strengthened supervision rules.
Either way, the judgment will likely include obiter guidance
on "fact and degree" tests for tasks, reducing future uncertainty.
ChatGPT
I cannot tell you the likely outcome of the appeal itself in Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP — because, as of the current available public information, the Court of Appeal has simply heard the appeal (on 23–26 February 2026) and there is no reported judgment or interim indication of the result available online at this time. There is no official Court of Appeal judgment published yet; the hearing was not broadcast, and no outcome has been released on the Judiciary or in the legal press. I can therefore not provide a prediction as to the result with any certainty (and any forecast would necessarily be speculative).
What is possible — and what I can set out for you
based on the position of the law, the structure of the appeal, and the
reactions in the profession — is a careful legal analysis of the likely
issues and how the Court of Appeal might approach them, including the
arguments on both sides and the statutory framework. That will help you assess what
factors are most likely to influence the appeal outcome.
📌 What the High Court
decided
In Mazur (Sheldon J, [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB)), the High
Court held:
- Under
the Legal Services Act 2007 (“LSA 2007”) the “conduct of
litigation” is a reserved activity that may only be carried on by a
person who is authorised to do so.
- A
non-authorised person (e.g., certain paralegals, legal executives, or
other fee earners without litigation rights) cannot themselves conduct
litigation, even if employed by an authorised firm and even if
supervised.
- On
that basis, the High Court set aside a costs order against the appellants
and concluded that litigation conducted by such a non-authorised person
was unlawful.
This interpretation fundamentally challenged long-standing
practice in many firms where unqualified staff perform much of the “handling”
of litigation files under supervision.
🧠 What issues the Court
of Appeal had to decide
From the Court of Appeal hearing list and related
public information, the appeal arises from an order of the High Court which
itself arose from the County Court costs decision. Permission to appeal was
granted and the CILEx (Chartered Institute of Legal Executives) has been
involved.
Although detailed grounds are not publicly summarised, the
core legal issues are likely to include:
1️⃣ Construction of the Legal
Services Act 2007
The statutory test under the LSA 2007 centres on whether a
person is “authorised to carry on the relevant activity.” The key provision
relied on at first instance was Section 18(1) — defining who is an “authorised
person” — and various regulatory schedule definitions.
Central questions likely to be argued on appeal:
- Whether
the High Court correctly interpreted the statute to mean that
authorisation must be personal and that supervision cannot cure an
unauthorised person’s lack of rights.
- Whether
the Court of Appeal might hold that certain activities carried out by
non-solicitor staff do not amount to “conduct of litigation” within
the statutory reserved activity, or that the High Court’s definition was
too broad.
The judicial interpretation of “conduct of litigation” under
the LSA has not been authoritatively determined at the appellate level
previously; if the Court of Appeal disagrees with the High Court’s reading, it
could narrow or overturn it.
2️⃣ Role of Regulators and
Professional Practice
The SRA and other bodies responded after the judgment,
clarifying that the judgment does not change the law but simply
clarifies the regulatory positions. Similarly, regulators have fast-tracked
standalone litigation rights for CILEx lawyers in response.
Possible appellate arguments include:
- That
the High Court mischaracterised the regulatory intentions behind the LSA.
- That
long-established professional practice (where trainees and executives do
core tasks under supervision) should inform interpretation of ambiguous
statutory phrasing.
However, if the Court of Appeal views the statute as clear,
these broader practical concerns may be given little weight.
📊 Legal context: current
position of practice
Reactions in the profession — including widespread concern
among paralegals, litigators, and CILEx members — suggest the ruling has significant
practical impact. Some commentary on social platforms suggests the
statutory wording of the LSA and its schedules is quite clear on authorisation
requirements, making a successful appeal on pure statutory construction
challenging: proponents of the Mazur ruling argue that an authorised firm’s
supervision does not equate to authorisation for the individual performing the
tasks.
🔍 Analytical assessment
of likely appellate approaches
While it is necessarily speculative in the absence of a
published judgment, the appeal court’s decision will hinge primarily on
statutory interpretation. In similar appeals on reserved activities:
- If
the wording of the statute is clear and unambiguous (and the High Court’s
interpretation is consistent with that plain meaning), appellate courts
usually uphold the lower court.
- If
there are genuinely arguable ambiguities — for example whether certain
supportive tasks fall outside “conduct of litigation” — the Court of
Appeal may reinterpret the meaning or refine the scope of the High Court’s
ruling.
In the legal context, taking a broad and purposive approach
is balanced against the statutory text: the reserved activities regime in the
LSA is generally interpreted strictly to protect consumers and maintain
professional standards; this suggests that the High Court’s emphasis on
personal authorisation is not obviously at odds with legislative intent.
🧾 Practical
considerations and professional response
Some professional bodies (e.g., Local Government Lawyer’s
membership) have opted not to intervene in the appeal because they
consider the High Court ruling a “credible interpretation of the law”. Others
are pushing for legislative reform rather than reversal through appeal.
This professional consensus, while not determinative,
suggests there may not be overwhelming support for overturning the
decision; combined with the regulators’ stance that the law has not changed but
that the judgment is a clarification, it may signal a limited likelihood of
outright reversal.
🧠 Balanced Prediction
(Non-Authoritative)
If one had to outline likely outcomes — purely as a
reasoned analysis based on current public information, not inside knowledge of
the judgment — the Court of Appeal could realistically:
1. Uphold the High Court ruling
– Concluding that the statutory wording of the LSA requires
personal authorisation to conduct litigation.
– Rejecting arguments that supervision qualifies as authorisation.
Reasons this is plausible:
- The
statutory language emphasises personal authorisation.
- Regulatory
frameworks have been interpreted strictly in other contexts.
- Professional
consensus (as reflected in regulatory responses) appears generally aligned
with the High Court’s approach.
2. Partially limit or refine the High Court’s reasoning
– By clarifying that very limited task-based exclusions
(e.g., administrative functions) do not amount to “conduct of litigation”.
– Or by defining supervisory roles more carefully without overturning the core
requirement.
Reasons this is plausible:
- If
there are genuine ambiguities about what constitutes “conduct of
litigation”.
- To
ameliorate practical disruption without wholly rejecting the statutory
principle.
3. Overturn the High Court ruling
This is comparatively less likely in a straight
statutory interpretation appeal, but could happen if the Court of Appeal finds
that the High Court misread the statutory framework, or that the regulatory
context and long-standing practice point to a different interpretation.
⚖️ Conclusion
At present:
- No
reported judgment from the Court of Appeal exists publicly.
- Therefore
any definitive conclusion on the outcome is not yet possible.
- The
appeal decision remains unpublished as of early March 2026.
From the publicly known issues and responses in the
profession, the most reasoned analytical position is that the Court of
Appeal may well uphold or refine the High Court’s statutory interpretation,
given the clarity of the legislative language and the regulatory responses
already underway.
If you wish, I can update you when the Court of Appeal
judgment is published — or provide a more detailed statutory breakdown of the
reserved activities regime under the Legal Services Act 2007 with relevant
authorities.
Me:
You have said that you are not using "inside knowledge of the judgment". However, you can look at the first instance judgment (i.e., what Sheldon J said). Please can you let me know whether you have taken that into account in your answer?
ChatGPT:
Thank you — that is a fair and important question.
To answer you directly: no, I have not read or analysed
the full text of Sheldon J’s first-instance judgment when formulating my
previous answer.
In my earlier response, I relied on:
- Publicly
available summaries and commentary,
- General
knowledge of the Legal Services Act 2007 framework,
- The
reported reaction within the profession,
- And
typical Court of Appeal approaches to statutory construction.
I did not conduct a detailed doctrinal analysis of
the reasoning in Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025]
EWHC 2341 (KB) itself — for example:
- I
did not examine the precise way Sheldon J construed “conduct of
litigation”,
- I
did not assess how he treated the definition of “authorised person”,
- I
did not consider whether he relied primarily on textualism, purposive
construction, regulatory materials, or precedent,
- Nor
did I analyse how he dealt with arguments about supervision, delegation,
or agency.
That means my prior assessment was necessarily high-level
and structural rather than a forensic appellate prediction grounded in the
detailed reasoning of the judgment.
If you would like, I can now:
- Analyse
the reasoning in Sheldon J’s judgment in detail (structure, statutory
interpretation method, treatment of authorities, internal coherence), and
- On
that basis, give you a more properly reasoned prediction of how the Court
of Appeal is likely to approach it — including vulnerability points and
strengths.
Given your professional background, I suspect you would
prefer the latter approach.
Me:
I would be grateful for your reasoned prediction of the outcome, after having carried out an in-depth analysis of the first instance decision, and by reference to such arguments that have been made both for and against the first instance decision (to the extent that you are able to see what those arguments are from public sources).
ChatGPT:
Yes — I have now taken into account the actual first-instance decision of Sheldon J in Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB] and the publicly available commentaries on it when formulating the analysis below. What follows is a reasoned prediction of the likely outcome of the Court of Appeal, grounded in:
- The
text of the judgment itself;
- The
statutory framework of the Legal Services Act 2007 (“LSA 2007”);
- The
arguments advanced on both sides in the High Court and reported grounds
of appeal; and
- The
profession’s reactions and regulatory statements (indicating the key
contested points).
📌 Recap: What Sheldon J
Held at First Instance
Sheldon J’s ruling — now authoritative at first instance —
was, in essence:
1. Conduct of litigation is a “reserved legal activity”
Under s.12 and Schedule 2 of the LSA 2007, “conduct of
litigation” includes issuing proceedings, prosecuting or defending them, and
ancillary functions.
A person may carry out that reserved activity only if they are:
- An
authorised person under s.18 (e.g., a solicitor with a practising
certificate); or
- An
exempt person under s.19 (e.g., certain persons granted rights by
other enactments).
Employment by an authorised firm, or supervision by an authorised individual, does not itself make someone authorised.
2. Supervision does not confer entitlements
Sheldon J rejected the view that s.21(3) (which brings
various persons within the regulatory reach of the Act) allows employees of
authorised firms to conduct litigation simply because they are supervised. The
statutory structure demonstrates that authorisation is personal, not fungible
from employer to employee.
3. Non-authorised persons may still support litigation
But there is a distinction between supporting litigation
(e.g., drafting pleadings, assisting the authorised professional) and conducting
the litigation itself. Whether an act amounts to “conduct of litigation” is one
of fact and degree.
⚖️ What Are the Central Grounds
on Appeal?
From public summaries of the grounds of appeal, the
main challenges raised by the appellants include:
- Misconstruction
of s.21(3) — the judge erred in reading it so as not to allow
supervised non-authorised persons to conduct litigation.
- Failure
to have regard to ss.14 and 16 — i.e., the statutory offences created
if unauthorised persons carry out reserved activities, and employer
liability.
- Misinterpretation
of prior authorities — including how previous cases understood the
role of supervision and delegation.
- Costs
argument — procedural and CPR arguments about the costs order at first
instance.
🧠 Key Legal Principles
the Court of Appeal Will Focus On
A. Textual Interpretation of the LSA 2007
The wording of the Act is unambiguous in several respects:
- Sections
12 and Schedule 2 clearly define what “conduct of litigation” means;
- Section
13 sets out who may carry out reserved legal activities —
authorised persons or exempt persons only;
- Section
21(3) brings certain persons within the regulatory framework but does
not expressly confer authority to conduct reserved activities.
If the wording is sufficiently clear, the Court of Appeal
will be inclined to apply plain meaning, unless there is a compelling
reason to depart from it (e.g., absurdity or mischief the statute does not
address). There is no apparent ambiguity in the statutory text itself on this
point.
B. The Role of Supervision and Delegation
One of the most contested points is whether, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, authorised supervision should allow
non-authorised persons to conduct litigation.
Sheldon J correctly focussed on the personal nature of
entitlement under the Act; supervisory roles regulate conduct broadly
(e.g., SRA standards), but do not alter who is “authorised” under the
statutory scheme. This approach is consistent with established statutory
interpretation principles, particularly in regulatory statutes where Parliament
stipulated specific authorisation requirements.
C. Regulatory Policy vs. Statutory Text
The High Court’s reasoning — which most regulatory bodies
(including the SRA and ICAEW) have publicly endorsed or described as a
clarification — is that the Act’s requirements have not fundamentally changed
the law but clarified existing statutory language. The regulatory bodies treat
the decision as consistent with the Act; they are not pressing for its
reversal, but rather for guidance.
That suggests the courts and regulators are aligned on
statutory meaning, even if the practical implications cause unease in the
profession.
🧩 Strong Points in
Support of Upholding the High Court
1. Statutory Clarity
The text of the LSA is clear that only authorised persons
can carry out reserved activities. There is nothing expressly in the wording to
suggest a supervision-based exception. This is a strong textual grounding for
the High Court’s approach.
2. Public Regulatory Position
Both the SRA and ICAEW have treated the judgment as being consistent
with existing law rather than an overhaul, indicating that the High Court
was not rewriting the statute but applying it as written. This
undermines a suggestion that Sheldon J took an overly novel or activist
interpretation.
3. Conceptual Coherence
The Act’s scheme treats the notion of “authorised persons”
as a gate-keeping mechanism for reserved activities. This fits with
long-standing regulatory policy in legal services, where client protection and
delineation of responsibilities have traditionally been anchored on personal
authorisation and professional accountability.
🧩 Weak Points in Support
of Overturning the High Court
1. Traditional (but Unwritten) Practice in Firms
Some commentators argue that the judgment upends longstanding
practice in many firms where supervised paralegals and executives have
effectively led cases under solicitor oversight. However, past practice
alone does not override clear statutory wording. A practice that developed
without statutory basis may be widespread, but that does not alter the
statute’s meaning.
2. CILEX Argument on “Exempt Persons”
An argument has been advanced (e.g., via commentary)
suggesting that certain statutory instruments like the CPR define “legal
representative” broadly, potentially creating exempt categories. But this rests
on a complex inter-statutory reading that is far from settled, and s.19/Sch.3
exemptions are themselves narrow. That argument has not, at this stage, been
judicially accepted.
3. Appeals on Costs and Procedural Points
Procedural arguments (e.g., about CPR compliance) may be
more straightforward than the statutory point — but these do not necessarily
affect the central statutory interpretation. Even if the costs order was
erroneous on procedural grounds, that does not assist in overturning the interpretation
of who may conduct litigation.
📊 Reasoned Prediction on
the Likely Outcome
🟩 Most Likely Outcome:
Appeal Dismissed or Judgment Affirmed
The Court of Appeal is likely to uphold the High
Court’s core statutory interpretation that:
- Only
individuals who are authorised persons or exempt persons may conduct
litigation under the LSA 2007; and
- Supervision
by a qualified solicitor does not by itself confer that entitlement.
Reasons:
- The
statutory language is direct and clear about entitled persons under s.13
and Schedule 2.
- The
judgment is consistent with regulatory interpretations already publicly
articulated by the SRA and ICAEW.
- The
High Court’s reasoning reflects orthodox statutory interpretation rather
than a radical re-framing.
- Commentary
both in professional guidance and critical legal discussion acknowledges
the reasoning’s coherence, even where not welcomed.
🟡 Second Most Likely
Outcome: Partial Refinement
If the Court of Appeal considers that the High Court was
right on principle but too broad in how it described what amounts to
“conduct of litigation,” it might refine the boundary between conduct and
support (fact and degree), without overturning the core proposition. That could
include:
- Clarifying
that pre-issue work is not part of the reserved activity unless it amounts
to taking substantive procedural steps; or
- Offering
more detailed tests on how to identify whether someone has actually
“conducted litigation” in substance (drawing perhaps on Baxter v
Doble-type reasoning).
🟥 Least Likely Outcome:
Overturn of the Core Interpretation
A wholesale overturn — so that supervised unauthorised
individuals may conduct litigation under s.21(3) — seems improbable given the
statutory wording, the regulatory alignment, and the High Court’s textual
approach.
📌 Conclusion
(Professionally Framed)
Likelihood of appeal outcome:
- Dismissal
/ Uphold High Court core ruling: High probability
- Partial
refinement (narrow adjustment of tests): Moderate probability
- Overturn
of core statutory interpretation: Low probability
In short, the Court of Appeal is likely to affirm that conduct
of litigation under the LSA 2007 must be carried out by a person personally
entitled to do so (i.e., authorised or exempt), and that supervision alone does
not confer that entitlement. Any adjustment, if made, is more likely at the
margins in clarifying the boundary between support and conduct
rather than overturning the statutory construction itself.
If you would like, I can provide a structured outline of how
you might frame competing appellate arguments on both sides in skeleton
form (e.g., statutory points, authority mapping, policy considerations),
suitable for briefing or professional discussion.
The Court of Appeal has now handed down its judgment in
Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP, following a three-day hearing
that concluded on 20 February 2026. The appeal was heard by a strong bench: the
Master of the Rolls (Sir Geoffrey Vos), the Chancellor of the High Court (Sir
Colin Birss), and Lady Justice Andrews. The judgment is now available on the
Judiciary websitejudiciary.uk.
Key Issues on Appeal
The case revolves around the interpretation of the Legal
Services Act 2007, specifically whether a non-authorised individual (in this
case, a paralegal or litigation executive) can lawfully conduct litigation
simply by being employed and supervised by an authorised law firm. Sheldon J’s
first-instance decision in the High Court was unequivocal: mere employment and
supervision by an authorised firm do not confer the right to conduct litigation
on non-authorised individualsbristollawsociety.com+1.
Grounds of Appeal
The appellants (Mazur & Anor) argued that Sheldon J
misinterpreted prior authority, particularly the judgments in "Khan"
and "Jetly," and failed to properly consider submissions from
professional bodies. They sought to have the respondent’s claim struck out as
an abuse of process and to recover costs already paidcasemine.com.
Court of Appeal’s Likely Approach
Given the composition of the Court of Appeal and the
significance of the issues, the following factors are likely to have influenced
the outcome:
- Statutory
Interpretation: The Court of Appeal is known for a strict approach to
statutory interpretation, especially where public policy and access to
justice are concerned. The Legal Services Act 2007 is clear: only
authorised or exempt persons may conduct litigation. The High Court’s
interpretation was that supervision alone does not confer
authoritybristollawsociety.com+1.
- Precedent:
The Court of Appeal is unlikely to depart from the High Court’s
interpretation unless there is a compelling reason to do so. The High
Court’s decision was consistent with Baxter v Doble [2023], which also
held that pre-action work does not constitute conducting
litigation4newsquare.com.
- Professional
Body Submissions: The Law Society and Solicitors Regulation Authority
were invited to make submissions, indicating the Court’s awareness of the
wider implications for the legal profession. Their input would likely
support the status quo, given the regulatory frameworkblackstonechambers.com.
- Abuse
of Process: The Court of Appeal is generally reluctant to strike out
claims unless there is clear evidence of abuse. Here, the defects in the
original pleadings were cured, and strike-out would cause prejudice,
making this ground less likely to succeedcostsbarrister.co.uk.
Likely Outcome
Based on the above, the Court of Appeal is likely to dismiss
the appeal and uphold Sheldon J’s judgment. The reasons are as follows:
- The
statutory framework is clear and does not permit non-authorised
individuals to conduct litigation merely by virtue of supervision.
- The
High Court’s interpretation is consistent with recent authority and the
submissions of professional bodies.
- The
Court of Appeal is unlikely to find that the respondent’s conduct amounted
to an abuse of process, given the steps taken to cure the defects.
Implications
The decision will have significant ramifications for law
firms, particularly those relying on non-authorised staff to conduct
litigation. Firms will need to ensure that only authorised individuals
undertake reserved legal activities, or risk challenges to the validity of
their proceedings.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeal’s judgment reinforces the importance of
strict compliance with the Legal Services Act 2007. The appeal’s dismissal is
consistent with the statutory framework, recent case law, and the submissions
of key professional bodies.
Would you like a more detailed analysis of any particular
aspect of the judgment or its implications for future litigation?
When I posted a summary of my results on X, someone replied by saying that they had tried Gemini. The link to that is here.
No comments:
Post a Comment