Tuesday, 13 December 2022
Come, muse, and sing of New Malden!
Thursday, 1 December 2022
High status beliefs: is Brexit the Britten of politics?
Thursday, 17 November 2022
On Wren-Lewis on cuts
Wednesday, 16 November 2022
Are the UK's cities poor because they are new?
I don't know if you can see it properly but I hope you get the idea. London (the upper-most orange bar) is rich, but all of the UK's other cities are relatively poor by European standards: even the likes of Warsaw, Prague, Budapest and Bilbao can be found in the mass of blue between London and Manchester (the second orange line).
So that's France. Now, let's take the cities in the list from Low Countries: Amsterdam, Brussels, Antwerp, Rotterdam and The Hague. I'm sure you don't need to be told that Amsterdam and Brussels were well-established before the Industrial Revolution, but you might not know that Antwerp was of comparable size to them in the Early Modern period. The Hague became the permanent seat of the States of Holland in 1588, so it was a big deal then. (Note also that these are OECD standard definition 'cities', so not quite what you might expect - "London" includes Sevenoaks, for example, and "Leeds" includes Bradford: "The Hague" includes Delft, to give you some idea of the antiquity of the urban area we are talking about.) I grant you that Rotterdam is a late arrival, interestingly mostly after 1872 (it's more of a post-industrial revolution city), but I would suggest that we see a similar pattern to France: pretty much all the successful cities were successful before the Industrial Revolution.
1. Winchester
2. Oxford
=3. Truro
=3. Bath
5. Chichester
6. Cambridge
7. Brighton and Hove
8. London
=9. St Albans
=9. Chelmsford
11. Salisbury
12. Exeter
13. Leicester
14. Norwich
15. Bristol
=16. Southampton
=16. Canterbury
=16. Gloucester
19. Worcester
20. Cardiff
To be absolutely blunt, we all know that nice old towns that escaped the Industrial Revolution are lovely places to visit or live. Durham and Stamford are small, pretty and expensive: this house is very lovely, but it's a 6 bedroom terraced house in Stamford, not a mansion in London, and yet it went for £2.8m (actual sale price). This 5 bedroom house in Durham has an asking price of £2.75m. These are big sums (and a bit different from nearby Newcastle or Peterborough).
So far, I've been talking about England in 1662 and comparing it with the UK today. That's not right: what about Scotland? Well, the picture is similar. The Scottish city in the list is Glasgow, another Industrial Revolution boom town, while Edinburgh, the charming combination of old Old Town and Georgian New Town and the biggest town in Scotland in the 1755 census, doesn't make the cut. A quick check on Rightmove says that Edinburgh is at least 50% more expensive than Glasgow. I accept that Glasgow was a well-established town before the Industrial Revolution, like Newcastle in that respect, but I don't think I'm stretching a point in saying that its post-Industrial Revolution history predominates.
Let's assume I'm right. On the Continent, for whatever reason, they have a number of big cities which are the equivalent of what would have happened if York or Norwich had taken Manchester's place in our industrial history, while our cities are Milton Keyneses or Dubais, shiny newbuilds or johnny-come-latelys. So what?
Let's go back to Forth's concern and Cowen's comment. The UK is richer than, say, Poland. So surely it's a bit odd that the UK's big cities are no richer than Poland's? Why should this be? Is there any reason to think that the fact that the UK's cities are "new", while the rest of Europe's are "old" is relevant?
This is a little speculative but I can think of two reasons why it might be relevant.
Possibly. But that wouldn't be easy. Take York, for example, a town so rich and lovely that, according to The Economist, it seeks to avoid any new developments at all. And who could blame it? It's been a long time since anyone could be confident that major developments on the edge of a cathedral city would result in a more attractive or pleasant town at the end of the process.
But what's the alternative? As ever with these things, it's a bit of a mix and match. The UK has moved its centres of (non-London) activity around before, from the Suffolk wool towns to northern industrial cities, for example, and no doubt it can do so again. There are geographical constraints on some of the smaller cities that people want to live in (Bristol and Brighton spring to mind), but towns that already have a dense Georgian street pattern can probably grow in numbers, at least to some extent, without growing in physical footprint. Other towns may find developers more sympathetic to their needs than those York has seen recently, and they will be able to grow outwards: Cambridge might be an example. Some big Industrial Revolution cities will find new life in the post-industrial age: Manchester may become a media-and-university powerhouse, for example, and it seems to do well in IT services too.
Monday, 14 November 2022
Ours is a High and Lonely Destiny: overcoming disingenuous cant from high priest of Effective Altruism
Or perhaps you prefer William Roper's approach?
William Roper: “So, now you give the Devil the benefit of law!”
Sir Thomas More: “Yes! What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?”
William Roper: “Yes, I'd cut down every law in England to do that!”
That's the spirit - don't let the devil hide behind mere man-made "laws" and "rights"!
Uncle Andrew is a weak and silly man, and yet he almost persuades Digory. Jadis is neither weak nor silly: she is magnificent, splendid and terrible, strong in mind and body. If Digory had not been innoculated to the message by having first received it from Uncle Andrew - or perhaps if he were more than merely a little boy - then surely he would have succumbed to the grandeur, breadth and daring of Queen Jadis' ideals.
Wednesday, 9 November 2022
Rare photo of Emperor Hirohito signing the Japanese unconditional surrender
Tuesday, 4 October 2022
Political betting - thinking aloud
Thursday, 29 September 2022
Boosters, Doomsters and all that jazz
I'll lay my cards on the table. As I said when I wrote about YIMBYs (who are generally the same people as Bowman's Boosters), I'm pretty receptive to the idea that it would be a good thing if Britain were to build more stuff. Equally, given the uphill struggle that YIMBY-Boosters face, I think we can overlook a certain amount of hyperbole in the way they put their case, both as to how bad the UK's situation is and how much better it could get. But - and of course there's a but - I'm far from convinced that the situation is as dire as the Boosters say it is. In fact, it seems to me that the so-called Boosters are the real Doomsters.
Tuesday, 13 September 2022
Amia Srinivasan's contribution to conservative thought
Thursday, 8 September 2022
Liz Truss: yet more betting success, and how she can succeed too
Friday, 2 September 2022
Normal People by Sally Rooney - some thoughts
Friday, 12 August 2022
Catching (and resisting) the viral virus
Friday, 22 July 2022
The Romance of the Past; or How to be a Happy Conservative
This made me think about the various ways of life known to antiquity that have not fallen by the wayside of modernity but survive to this day. My professional life provides various examples. Not only am I a lawyer - a profession long-established by the time of the Romans - but it is not unusual for one of my cases to be readily explicable, both to laymen of today and those of classical times, by telling a story about a Greek merchant who wanted to buy a ship to carry cargoes of oil. Various technical details of the story would seem like science fiction to the ancient Greeks, but they would have no more difficulty in understanding what it is essentially all about than you would have in understanding the frustration of a Flargle-trader from the planet Xargan who wanted to buy an interstellar space cruiser but found out that the hyperdrive wouldn't reach the Gamma Quadrant (allegedly). Indeed, any ancient Greeks listening to my story would not be terribly surprised to hear that the ship in question was designed to fit through the current Suez Canal, which is merely the latest in a series of canals built in the region since the Sixth Dynasty of Egypt.
Monday, 18 July 2022
On Effective Altruism
Thursday, 7 July 2022
Update on 2022 predictions
"(1) Macron will be re-elected President of France.
(3) Article 16 of the Brexit Protocol will not be triggered.
(4) No new British political party, whether centrist, Corbynist or other, will get any real traction
(5) The cool new thing in European politics will be pro-natalist policies."
Monday, 30 May 2022
Summer Hours: more on inanimate objects
Friday, 13 May 2022
What We Learn from the Conservative Case for Abortion
Wednesday, 27 April 2022
Money and Freedom
I’m not the first to
spot that the world is a funny old place, nor that recent political
developments have created strange bedfellows.
Here’s a new example, prompted by this thread about the fundamental importance of
the “freedom to transact”, i.e. the freedom to use money. The point the thread
makes is that the effective exercise of various freedoms, e.g. to express one’s
views or practise one’s religion, will tend to require spending money. If
people refuse to take your money – or if the government stops you from being
able to use it – then your freedom is infringed. If your cards stop working and
your bank account is frozen, whether that’s because a private company doesn’t
like your politics or because a government diktat stops you, then you have less
freedom. Seems plausible, right?
But if that is right then surely it follows that, in normal circumstances,
people who have more money, and can therefore transact more, have more freedom,
and there’s something a bit odd about that.
Let’s go back a few years. The standard right-wing position was to be deeply
concerned about whether people in a society have freedom, by which they meant freedom
properly so-called, i.e., the freedom to associate as they want, say what they
want, make the most of their own lives etc etc. If that resulted in some people
becoming rich and other people becoming poor then tough, said the right-wing
people, so be it.
The left-wing position, by contrast, was to be more concerned about the distribution of resources in society. Left-wing people took the view that if remedying that distribution meant infringing on people’s freedom to make profits or accumulate wealth then, again, tough and so be it. And so the battle lines were drawn up.
The right-wing position in that debate was that money is nothing to do with
freedom. Money was understood to be a good thing, but just one of the many assets
with which you might try to persuade other free agents in a free society to do
things that you wanted them to do. They can refuse your money, just as they can
refuse any of your other attempts at persuasion (you could try using your charm
or good looks or family connections or ...), and no question of force or lack
of freedom would arise. More money means more options, just as being able to
run faster means that there are more places you can get to within a given time
period, but none of that is anything to do with coercion, none of that is to do
with people with guns putting you in prison or the kind of stuff that
affects freedom properly so-called, i.e. the stuff that really
matters in politics.
Another battleground in the same war used the terminology of human rights. The Left tried to expand the scope of human rights beyond the old-fashioned ones to do with freedom from torture and arbitrary imprisonment, freedom of speech and so on to include newer economic, social and cultural rights. These, the UN tells us, “include the rights to adequate food, to adequate housing, to education, to health, to social security, to take part in cultural life, to water and sanitation, and to work.” The Right pushed back, saying that these rights are nothing to do with freedom, that they are stretching the concept of “human rights” beyond what it will bear: these kinds of “rights” are just demands for the redistribution of assets and nothing to do with the fundamental freedoms that human rights protect.
So that was the old debate: narrow freedom and traditional human rights on the
one hand, versus redistribution and expanded “rights” on the other. Nice and
clear.
One of the most interesting contributions to that debate came when the socialist philosopher GA Cohen once delivered a paper at All Souls arguing that lack of money really did mean lack of freedom properly so-called, freedom in the sense that the Right would have to accept. I’m not going to go into it now, but you'll get the idea if you think of banknotes as being like little State-endorsed vouchers that permit you to take potatoes from a shop, say, or ride on a train: if you don't have the little vouchers and you try to exercise your 'paper' freedom of movement to wander into the shop and out again with potatoes, or onto the inter-city train, then you will find yourself physically restrained and eventually jailed.
You can also get some flavour of the idea from the thread that I linked to at the start. That thread was prompted, I think, by the Canadian truck protests, i.e. by a right-wing concern rather than a left-wing one, but the point holds good either way: if you don’t have money (or the ability to use your money) then your freedom to go about your life in the way you wish, including your freedom of movement/expression/religion etc, is severely impaired. Do you really have freedom of movement if you can't afford to get on the train, or if the petrol station won't take your money and refuses you petrol? We might even decide to park the debate about whether it is really ‘freedom’ that you don’t have if you have no (usable) money in your wallet, but we can at least agree that you lack something valuable to do with freedom, or something that gives value to freedom.
Let’s return to everyday life, where money can be used and bank accounts are
not frozen. Having the “freedom to transact” (or, if you prefer, having the
wherewithal to make your paper freedoms valuable and usable) will inevitably
entail having money. To be someone who values the “freedom to transact” as part
of a narrow definition of freedom will, I think, mean being someone who is at
least receptive to the idea that living a free life in a modern society
requires a certain amount of money. It will mean being someone who is at least
willing to entertain the notion of the redistribution of wealth or income, and therefore
willing to entertain the entire freedom-infringing state paraphernalia that
comes with such redistribution.
That’s quite a shift in standard right-wing thought. But you’ve probably seen a lot of that kind of thing recently. You’ll have noticed that the thinking Right (and Right-adjacent thought) has become much less sympathetic to untrammelled capitalism over the last few years. I think it’s fair to say that these kinds of consideration, namely an awareness that the operation of private entities in a market economy can have a profound impact on the exercise or value of freedom, are part of the reason why.
But I wouldn’t want to leave this discussion without reminding you of the kinds of argument that caused the thinking Right to try to separate questions of how much money (or other assets) individuals should have from questions about what the State should be doing with its time and powers. To do that, I am going to take you to Scott Alexander’s recent post about “Justice creep”, i.e. the way that apparently everything is about justice nowadays: “Helping the poor becomes economic justice. If they’re minorities, then it’s racial justice, itself a subspecies of social justice. Saving the environment becomes environmental justice, except when it’s about climate change in which case it’s climate justice. Caring about young people is actually about fighting for intergenerational justice”, and so on.
Alexander followed up his post expressing some concerns with this rhetorical development with a compilation of comments he had received. Inspired by one comment in particular, Alexander says this:
“The argument for why poverty is a justice issue goes something like this:
- Some people are suffering terribly
- It’s not their fault, and they’ve done nothing to “deserve to
suffer”
- Other people have much more than they need
- This has been brought about through the choices of individuals
and governments. Maybe nobody specifically says “I choose for Jeff Bezos to be
a billionaire and Somali orphans to starve to death.” But a lot of people keep
giving more money to Jeff Bezos and not helping Somali orphans. And governments
generally enforce (or at least refuse to intervene against) the economic system
that makes this keep happening. And voters keep re-electing the politicians who
allow this.
- Therefore, there is injustice.”
He then
takes the case of incels. “Not necessarily actually-existing incels”,
he hastens to add, “but some hypothetical best-case scenario for the
philosophy. Let’s say a guy with a birth defect that makes him horribly
deformed, nobody will date him, and this makes him depressed and suicidal.”
Think about that disfigured man, replace “poverty” in the argument above with “being
highly off-putting to the opposite sex” and, well, you can see how the argument
goes.
And that takes us back to our starting point. You will recall that I said above that the traditional right-wing view was that money was just one of many assets that a person might have that can be used to get what he or she wants. As I said, instead of using money, “you could try using your charm or good looks or family connections or ...”: you may find one or more of those stand you in better stead in your search for a mate than money does.
Or you could think about it this way. Here are some good things in life: a happy lifelong romantic relationship; a full panoply of old-fashioned freedoms/human rights to associate and speak freely; and enough food to live on. What is your rationale for saying that the State has to work hard to give you some of those good things but can leave to it chance as to whether you get others?
You will recall famous quotations of the likes of “The law, in its majestic equality, forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread” and “In England, justice is open to all—like the Ritz Hotel”. These are the kinds of jibe which, as we saw above, the modern Right is perhaps now willing to concede might have some force: perhaps a certain freedom and wherewithal to contract are a necessary part of freedom. But what about this: “In England, marriage is open to all—like the Ritz Hotel”? Or “The law, in its majestic equality, permits socially able and losers alike to ...”. You get the picture.
I’m sure you agree that this is all crazy and that the distribution of sexual favours is nothing to do with politics. But of course, Amia Srinivasan and many others would disagree: they’d say that it’s a central concern of modern politics.
I think the fear of this kind of craziness was a motivation behind the Right’s desire to draw a firm line in the sand around a narrow definition of “freedom” and to object to the expansion of the sphere of “human rights”. Let’s go back to the UN’s list of expanded rights. This right to “take part in cultural life”: does that mean going to concerts? Going to concerts on dates? And if we can always “take part in cultural life” why we shouldn’t we also be entitled to “take part in non-cultural social life”, in much the same way that freedom to practise a religion means freedom to practise no religion?
All of which, I am afraid, is to take us back to a conclusion rather similar to that I reached in when discussing freedom of speech, namely that it is probably not possible to resolve these kinds of issue solely by reference to principle. Judgment and sound instincts are required instead. Sadly, however, many of the sound instincts that were built up over time, buttressed by perhaps insufficiently thought-through justifications based on liberalism, and deployed without much thought only a few years ago now seem outmoded. It does not seem like a positive development to me, but it is at least very interesting to watch.
Sunday, 27 March 2022
Where have all the geniuses gone? Or: what's the real replication crisis?
- In art, Monet painted Le déjeuner sur l'herbe, Renoir exhibited at the Paris Salon and was painted by Sisley, William Morris set up a wallpaper company, Rossetti was being upset after the death of his wife and Gilbert Scott was hard at work on the Midland Hotel (at St Pancras station) and the Foreign Office, among many other projects.
- In science, Alfred Nobel invented dynamite (patented 1867), James Clerk Maxwell published his equations that quantify the relationship between electricity and magnetism and show that light is a form of electromagnetic radiation, Lister developed the antiseptic methods for use in surgery in 1867, introducing carbolic acid as an antiseptic, turning it into the first widely used surgical antiseptic in surgery, and publishing Antiseptic Principle of the Practice of Surgery, Gregor Mendel formulated his laws of inheritance, the basis for genetics, in a two-part paper written in 1865 and published in 1866, and Dmitri Mendeleev developed the periodic table.
- In music, the decade saw the composition of Tristan und Isolde, Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg, Brahms' Requiem; Verdi's Requiem and Aida were both commissioned; Bruch wrote his violin concerto; Mussorgsky finished Night on Bald Mountain, Lizst wrote a coronation Mass, while Bruckner wrote three Masses and various motets including Locus Iste.
The author of the piece I linked to above, Erik Hoel, suggests that the reason for this catastrophe is the decline of what he calls aristocratic tutoring. (The word "aristocratic" is intended to refer to the kind of private tuition employed by the well-to-do for the general education of their children and to distinguish it from the kind of tutoring used by pushy parents nowadays to get children into competitive schools.)
That's just a very silly theory and we don't need to do more than look at the names in the list of achievements from the 1860s above to see that it's wrong: by and large, these people simply weren't aristocrats or people who had the education of aristocrats. And as for those people who did have the education of aristocrats, Grand Tour and all, what became of them? Not a lot, on the whole.